Kant, Reinhold, and the Status of Transcendental Philosophy

Abstract
Kant, as is well known, considers cognitions of objects to require both concepts and intuitions. Since this criterion needs to be met by both empirical and a priori cognition, it allows him to reject the a priori judgments about the soul, the world as such, and God characteristic of post-Leibnizian metaphysics. Since, however, the activity Kant carries out in the *Critique of Pure Reason* itself does not seem to rest on intuition, it is unclear how the apodictic certainty Kant believed his own analyses to yield can be accounted for. In *On the Foundation of Philosophical Knowledge*, Reinhold addresses this question by claiming that everything Kant proves in his work is proven from concepts alone and could not have been proven in any other way. If Reinhold is right, what resources does Kant offer in the *Critique of Pure Reason* to distinguish the mode of a priori cognition he rejects from the mode of a priori cognition he himself enacts? In order to answer this question, it will be necessary to investigate the various senses in which Kant uses the terms ‘object’ and ‘objective’ as well as the activities he attributes to pure reason and the pure understanding.

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